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Perceptions of Implementation:
Treaty Signatory Views of Treaty
Implementation
Jean‑Pierre Morin
The views expressed in this communication are those of the author, and not
necessarily those of the Government of Canada.

Introduction
Since the rebirth of the Indian Rights movement, Treaty First Nations and the
Government of Canada have agreed to disagree. Both sides have radically different
perspectives of the same issue: the implementation of the Numbered Treaties.
On the one hand, Treaty First Nations have argued that the Numbered Treaties
have not been fully implemented and that the Government of Canada continues to
refuse to honour to its treaty obligations. The Government of Canada, on the other
hand, counters that it has substantially implemented and fulfilled its treaty obligations. For cases in which First Nations groups have maintained that treaty terms
remain unfulfilled, the specific claims process has been created to address their
allegations. This disagreement on the degree of implementation of the Numbered
Treaties is a major underlying cause of conflict between Canada and Treaty First
Nations on Numbered Treaty issues, which, in turn, is affecting the implementation of modern initiatives, programs, and agreements—not to mention increasing
the financial and resource costs associated with them through such delays.
This is, however, not a modern debate. Immediately after the signing of
Treaties 4 and 6 in 1874 and 1876, it was clear that both parties to the treaties had
different understandings of how the treaties would be implemented. To the Crown,
the terms of the treaties were clearly spelled out in the text, and it was understood
that the written terms were to be strictly adhered to. Treaty chiefs, however, argued
that the treaty terms as described were incomplete and insufficient to help them
cope with a changing living environment. To understand the modern Numbered
Treaty debate, it is useful to examine the origins of the conflict—specifically,
how the treaty signatories’ views of treaty implementation were expressed in the
first 20 years after the treaty signings, and how these views had an impact upon
the relations between the Government of Canada and First Nations peoples. It
was clear from the first year after the treaty signings that the Crown and Aboriginal signatories did not share the same view of the treaties. While Treaty chiefs
repeatedly called upon the Department of Indian Affairs and Ottawa to fulfill their
— 123 —
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promises through letters and petitions, the government steadfastly stuck to its
policy of strict adherence to the terms of the text. As hardship befell the bands
in the northwest, they pushed for fulfilment and some even asked to renegotiate
the treaties. Through all this, Ottawa continued to reject all complaints about the
treaties and increased the pressure on bands to settle on reserves. A clash between
the two was inevitable.
While it would have been useful to examine all treaty areas in the Northwest
Territories, such an expansive study is not practical in this instance. In order
to develop a better, representative understanding of the issues at hand and the
evolution of the growing conflict between the Government of Canada and First
Nations in the Northwest, two treaty regions will be used as a type of case study
of the Northwest. The areas included in Treaties 4 and 6, covering what is now
southern and central Saskatchewan as well as central Alberta, are the best to
represent the conflict because of the large volume of correspondence from bands
in these areas to the Crown expressing their opinions regarding the implementation of the treaties. Furthermore, the Department of Indian Affairs saw several
of the chiefs in these two areas as “troublesome,” and kept substantial record of
their opinions on these particular tribes and their claims. Finally, departmental
officials also responded to the claims being made by the Treaty 4 and 6 chiefs, in
which they elaborated and debated the Crown’s obligation and its fulfilment of
treaty promises.

Treaty Signings
Shortly after the transfer of Rupert’s Land to the Dominion of Canada in 1869,
Canada undertook the negotiation of a series of treaties across the Northwest
Territories. Obligated by the terms of the Rupert’s Land Act and the Northwest
Territories Act, the Dominion wanted to secure the Aboriginal title to the lands
in the Northwest so as to facilitate settlement and development of the Territories.
Furthermore, events in the United States, such as the Indian Wars and calls for the
annexation of the Northwest Territories, pushed Canada to quickly establish its
authority and sovereignty over its newly acquired territories. As the Indian Wars
raged south of the border, the Dominion was concerned that, without treaties, the
violence would spread north and engulf the bands in Canada. Over the span of 50
years, 11 treaties were negotiated and signed, covering northern Ontario, all of the
Prairies, northeastern British Columbia, and the MacKenzie Valley, and involved
territory covering some three million square kilometres.
In the case of Treaties 4 and 6, the negotiation and conclusion of the treaties
were only done after a considerable number of requests from the Aboriginal
populations of the North and South Saskatchewan rivers. After initially refusing
to do so, the government conceded to increasing demands and appeals from the
area’s Aboriginal population and the Northwest Territories Council and sent
Commissioners to negotiate Treaty 4 at Fort Qu’Appelle. Alexander Morris, the
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lieutenant-governor of the Northwest Territories, along with David Laird, Minister
of the Interior, and other commissioners negotiated a treaty with the Aboriginal
peoples throughout the Qu’Appelle Valley and in the vicinity of the CanadaUnited States border.1 In September 1874, after negotiations at Qu’Appelle and
Fort Ellice, the treaty commissioners and the chiefs agreed to use the same terms
as those in Treaty 3 with little variation (Taylor 1985, 28).
After the geological survey team, which was exploring and mapping the Territories, and a telegraph construction crew were stopped by Aboriginal people in
the untreated areas in the summer of 1875, the Dominion government decided
to undertake the negotiation of Treaty 6, with Morris heading the commission
(Taylor 1985, 7). Treaty meetings were held in August and September 1876, at
Fort Carlton, and further west at Fort Pitt on the North Saskatchewan River. While
there was considerable dissent among the different assembled bands, Morris and
the other commissioners managed to secure a treaty, but only after conceding
some significant additions to the treaty terms (Morris 1881/1991, 176-77). These
concessions were criticized by Ottawa, but the criticisms were allayed by Morris’
reassurances that it was the only deal acceptable to the chiefs.2
While Canada’s stated goal in the treaty process was to secure its authority and
sovereignty over the Northwest, Aboriginal signatories had different goals and
intents. It was central for them to secure some compensation for the inevitable
loss of their land to growing settlement, and they needed assistance in making
the transition towards an agricultural lifestyle. During the negotiations for both
Treaties 4 and 6, the chiefs called for more assistance, more food, more seed, more
cattle, and more implements. The treaties also promised to avoid any possible
violent conflicts between the Aboriginal population and white settlers, a concern
especially in light of the Indian Wars in the United States. As Blair Stonechild
states, “it was ... this sentiment for peace that the Indian leaders were receptive to
the signing of treaties in the 1870s. Not only had Indians never been at war with
whites in the Northwest, but they also sought to prevent such a thing from ever
happening” (1986). For these chiefs, the treaties created a relationship between
the Northwest’s Aboriginal population and Canada that ensured not only peace in
the Territories, but also the survival of the area’s original inhabitants.

Initial Reaction to Treaty Terms and
Implementation
As the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs settled into the administration of Ottawa’s policies and the fulfilment of the Crown’s treaty obligations,
problems with the treaties were becoming apparent. At both signings, a significant number of bands were absent. It has been estimated that, during the negotiations at Qu’Appelle in 1874, nearly half of the Aboriginal population either
was not present at the signing or refused to sign at that time. These included
some of the most influential chiefs, such as Piapot. In his historical study of the
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implementation of Treaty 4, Raoul McKay reports that most of the Assiniboine
bands between the Cypress and the Touchwood Hills refused to adhere to the
treaty (McKay 1973, 41). Morris himself, in his report of the treaty negotiations,
recognized that not all the bands were present at the signing of the treaty. At his
stop at Fort Ellice, Morris added to the number of adherents when he convinced
two Saulteaux chiefs also to sign the treaty (124). Even with this second signing
of 1874, there were still some 600 to 700 Crees, Saulteaux, and Assiniboine who
had not yet signed.
A similar situation existed during the negotiations for Treaty 6, during which
several prominent chiefs were absent during the Fort Pitt negotiations. When
Morris and the Treaty Commission arrived, some one hundred lodges were
gathered to meet them. A large number of Cree and Saulteaux were out on a
hunt, as a herd of buffalo had been spotted in the vicinity (Taylor 1985, 23).
While messengers were sent out to fetch some chiefs, such as Sweet Grass, others
were ignored or forgotten. Two such prominent chiefs were Big Bear and Little
Pine, who controlled some 85 lodges between them (Dempsey, 1984, 71). Morris
believed that Sweet Grass was the principal chief of the district and that, with
his presence, there was no need to wait for the other chiefs to arrive (Morris
1881/1991, 179). This decision would have dire consequences for the relations
between the Treaty 6 bands and the Crown.
The absence of a large number of bands at the 1874 signing of Treaty 4 became a
serious issue during the first treaty annuity payment. Two members of the original
treaty commission, W.J. Christie and M.G. Dickieson, arrived at Fort Ellice
in 1875 to find twice the number lodges that had been present a year previous. A
council had been held prior to the arrival of the government officials, and Christie
and Dickieson were surprised to discover that the assembled bands wanted new
terms for the treaty. In his report to David Laird, Minister of the Interior and
Treaty 4 Commissioner, Christie warned the chiefs that a refusal of the terms
of the 1874 treaty would result in a report to the government that the chiefs had
“broken the agreement.” In her study of the agricultural policies of the Department of Indian Affairs in the Northwest, Sarah Carter states that “officials saw
the treaty as a ‘covenant’ between the Indians and the Government; therefore it
was impossible to comply with new demands” (Carter 1990, 74). While Christie
agreed to hear the chiefs’ demands and report them back to Ottawa, Christie and
Dickieson did not include the demands in the official report of the adhesion and
annuity payment. Rather, they included them in a separate letter to Laird. In their
letter, the commissioners indicated that they explained the main premises of the
treaty to the bands, that all bands be treated equally. They also had stressed to
the assembled bands that the original agreement should be respected. For their
part, the assembled First Nations had made three demands: more money, more
implements, and more assistance. The annuity set in Treaty 4 was regarded as
insufficient, and the chiefs asked for the annuity to be increased from $5 to $12 a
person. They also requested an increase in the amount spent on ammunition and
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twine from $750 for the entire treaty area to $250 per year per band. In regard
to agricultural implements, they demanded a blacksmith and a forge, mowers,
and mills for every reserve, as well as the implements offered in 1874. The most
important demands they made dealt with assistance to the bands. The chiefs recognized that they needed assistance to make the transition to agriculture. They asked
for more rations, medicines, and someone to teach them how to farm and build
houses.3 In reply to these demands by both Treaty and non-Treaty bands, Christie
and Dickieson stated that none of these concerns and demands had been brought
up at the Qu’Appelle signing in 1874. They followed up by saying that these
demands could not be considered rights, but if they were fulfilled they would only
be considered “favours.” Dickieson and Christie reported that they had made it
clear to the chiefs that they did not believe that these demands would be granted:
“At the same time, we held out no hope that any would be granted except that a
man might be sent possibly to shew them how to use their tools.”4
Christie and Dickieson’s reaction to the chiefs’ demands for a renegotiation of
treaty terms was typical of the position that the Department of Indian Affairs held
regarding calls for new terms for the treaties.  Over the next 10 years, all calls
for new treaties or terms were answered in the same way: The treaty terms were
established at the time of signing and those terms could not be changed. Not only
could the terms not be changed, the exact wording of the text had to be strictly
followed. The federal government had intended the Numbered Treaties to be their
main tool for securing Canada’s interests to the lands of the Northwest at the
lowest possible cost (Dyck 1986, 122). Treaty commissioners and the officers of
the Department of Indian Affairs saw the treaties as once and for all agreements
to exchange Aboriginal interests to the Crown for benefits. The interpretation of
the terms, in the eyes of the government, was under no circumstances to be left to
the Aboriginal signatories. As no provisions in the treaties allowed for any type of
arbitration in the case of disagreement, the department maintained that its interpretation of the written text was the most accurate (McKay 1972, 39). Ottawa also
believed itself to be in a position of strength, both legally and morally, compared
to the bands. Indian policy in the late nineteenth century was largely guided by
the civilization projects of the department, and officials, politicians, and the public
at large maintained that it was their responsibility to bring the Indian towards the
more “civilized,” British Victorian way of life. Furthermore, the treaties bound
the Treaty bands to the law of Canada, as well as binding them to fulfilling their
half of the treaty promises—“yielding, ceding and surrendering” their interests
and title to the land (39). But while the government had a legal system to enforce
Aboriginal fulfilment of the treaty terms, there was no such mechanism to enforce
a mutually acceptable interpretation of the Crown’s obligations.
As demonstrated by the 1875 requests for renegotiation of the terms of
Treaty 4, the fulfilment of the clauses regarding agricultural implements and
assistance was one of the central grievances of Treaty bands. As several historians have shown, the Crown was not willing to commit fully to the lifestyle
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transformation of the Plains Indians, regardless of its own rhetoric. The Department of Indian Affairs was not prepared to undertake the logistics of establishing
an administrative infrastructure or providing practical assistance to bands attempting to farm (Dyck, 1986 125). In addition to the logistical nightmare of transferring some 60,000 people from a nomadic to a settled agricultural lifestyle, the
department was hampered by constant financial shortfalls and budgetary restrictions. As McKay’s study of the implementation of Treaty 4 suggests, the terms of
the treaties themselves did not allow for sufficient funds or rations to allow bands
to gain a foothold in their new lives as agriculturalists (McKay 1972, 131).
The terms of the treaties were to be followed exactly and precisely. This strict
adherence to the text not only limited the extent of the Crown’s treaty obligations, but was also fiscally prudent for the government. In both Treaties 4 and 6,
the agricultural benefits were only to be issued to bands that had first settled on a
reserve and broken the ground. Treaty 4 states that “It is further agreed between
Her Majesty and the said Indians that the following articles shall be supplied to
any band thereof who are now actually cultivating the soil, or who shall hereafter
settle on their reserves and commence to break up the land.”5 To departmental
officials, both this clause and the similar one in Treaty 6 limited the Crown’s
responsibility for issuing implements and cattle only to those bands that were
settled on a reserve and who had already broken up soil prior to receiving implements, although this does lead to the question of how the agricultural implements
clauses of the treaties would assist the bands to adopt agriculture if implements
were only issued to bands already engaged in farming. Furthermore, departmental
officials stated that implements were not to become the property of the bands or
chiefs. Rather, the tools, and even the cattle, remained the property of the government and any damage to them could be judged as vandalism of Crown property.
Departmental officials were reluctant to replace damaged tools because of the
cost, but also because some believed that it would serve little purpose to do so.
At the time of the implementation of the treaties, an economic slowdown
was having a serious impact upon the business of the Canadian government.
The worldwide recession, later a depression, lasted some 20 years, and severely
reduced the federal government’s revenues, which were based on excise taxes
and duties. At the same time, a new deputy superintendent general of Indian
Affairs was taking charge, centralizing decision making and changing the administration of the department. Lawrence Vankoughnet, a high-ranking Tory from
Cornwall, Ontario and a long-time supporter of Sir John A. Macdonald, was a
micro-manager of the highest order. Vankoughnet centralized all decisions into
his own hands and removed nearly all the discretionary powers of Indian agents,
including those of the Indian commissioner in the Northwest (Carter 1990, 51).
He seldom took the advice of men in the field and relied almost entirely upon
his own opinions. Vankoughnet was also renowned for his frugality and efforts
to minimize costs; his efforts created a slow and largely inefficient administration.6 Vankoughnet’s administration made no distinction between the funds spent
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for treaty implementation and those spent for general assistance to bands, such
as the issuing of rations. To him, all were expenses that needed to be cut. After
his 1881 tour of the Northwest, during which he met with several chiefs and
visited reserves, Vankoughnet dramatically cut $140,000 from the departmental
budget, dismissed clerks and agents, and ordered the reduction of rations (Dempsey 1984, 121).
The deputy superintendent also was interested in reducing costs. Laird’s replacement (as of 1876) as minister of the Interior and ex officio superintendent general
of Indian Affairs was David Mills, who believed that more than enough had been
done in the few years since the signing of the treaties to encourage the transition
of First Nations people to agriculture. He also held the notion that, during Laird’s
ministry, the government had been far too generous in issuing implements, tools,
and cattle (Carter 1990, 69). With the goal of reducing costs, the department
was to limit the distribution of tools and implements. Along with Vankoughnet and Mills, other officials in Ottawa had begun to develop, along with their
desire to cut spending, a view that Canada was being too generous towards the
Treaty bands, and that such “charity” was detrimental to the civilization of Aboriginal people.
While it is true to state that the Department of Indian Affairs was spending
far more than was required by the terms of the treaties for rations, implements,
and cattle, these expenditures were still insufficient to permit a proper transition from hunting to farming. Reports of bands killing their cattle for food were
frequent, as were accounts of individuals begging at the doors of white settlers.
These incidents did not lead departmental officials to recognize problems with the
agricultural policy or the insufficiency of the rations being issued. Instead, politicians and bureaucrats saw these incidents as examples of laziness, or a refusal to
become self-sufficient. This opinion was widespread throughout Indian Affairs. In
a letter to Alexander Morris in 1873, Edward McKay stressed that the transition
to an agricultural way of life would not be easy for the Plains people: “The Plains
Indians accustomed to an easy, free, and lazy existence will not in the present
generation take to farming unless compelled to do so.”7
By the end of the 1870s, the belief that treaty bands had no desire to make the
transition to agriculture because they preferred to live by government handouts was
the dominant view of officials, and this opinion coloured all subsequent relations
with First Nations. With the desired goal of compelling Aboriginal people to adopt
farming, in concordance with the government’s underlying goal of civilizing the
Treaty bands, and influenced by the Victorian belief that charity leads to laziness,
the Department of Indian Affairs adopted a ration policy of “food for work.” The
issuance of rations became directly tied to the work Aboriginal bands undertook,
and their adoption of agriculture, treaty benefits, and government assistance were
rolled into the central issue of rations.  Rations were issued to individuals who
were working on their reserves, for their agents, or, after the creation of instructional farms, for the farm instructors. Agents were instructed to feed only those
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who were willing to work and to criticize openly those who did not (McKay 1972,
114). The issuance of rations was not only used to encourage farming. On several
occasions, officials such as Indian commissioner, Edgar Dewdney, used the
issuance of rations as tool for Aboriginal compliance. When trying to get bands
to stay on their reserves, Dewdney ordered that rations were only to be issued on
a band’s respective reserve.8 The department’s rations policy quickly became a
major complaint for Treaty bands.
The government’s interpretation of the treaty terms, and the desire to reduce
expenditures as well as the growing administrative structure of the department,
had a severe impact on its ongoing relationship with Treaty chiefs. In her paper
“Magnificent Gifts,” Jean Friesen explains that “to the Indians, disillusioned
with the government’s unilateral interpretation, increasingly confined in their
economic opportunities, and ruled by the federal Indian Act to which they had
never consented, the treaties came to be seen in the words of a Saskatchewan
chief as merely ‘sweet promises’ ” (Friesen 1999, 212). Only a few years after
the signing of the treaties, chiefs were beginning to believe that the treaties had
serious shortcomings and that the Indian Affairs department did not see the treaties
in the same way as they did. Because the buffalo disappeared much more quickly
than anyone had expected—the conservative estimates at the time had been 10 or
more years before their total disappearance—Aboriginal populations lost not only
their main food staple but also their main economic staple within five years of the
signing the treaties (McKay 1972, 110). While Morris and Laird had promised
that the treaties would allow the bands to prosper and adapt to the new realities of
the Northwest, in reality the Aboriginal population had begun a steady economic
and social regression from their pre-treaty lives.
The annual treaty annuity payments, which were made at a gathering of bands
on the site of the treaty negotiations until 1879, were a popular occasion for chiefs
to express their dissatisfaction with government policy and treaty implementation.
At the first treaty payment after the signing of Treaty 6 at Fort Carlton, complaints
and concerns about the treaty culminated in the drafting of a petition that stated
that the government had broken the treaty because of its non-fulfilment of the
terms. The petition further called upon the governor general to reopen the negotiations so as to make it more generous towards the bands.9 This incident created
much concern for the Indian agent, Captain James Walker, who was completely
taken aback by the complaints. Walker, who had been at Carlton but returned to
Battleford, attributed the reason for the petition upon the late arrival of treaty
goods and provisions to Fort Carlton. He reported to G.M. Dickieson that all the
assembled chiefs had signed the petition and already sent it to Ottawa.10 This
petition referred to the treaty of 1876 as nothing but “sweet promises” to the
bands so that they would surrender their lands. In an effort to resolve the situation,
Walker called a council of the chiefs and explained why the presents had not been
distributed at the time of the payments. Through the influence of Mistowasis and
Ah-kha-ta-koop, two chiefs who had led the campaign for the adhesion of the
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bands to the treaty in 1876, Walker was able to convince the chiefs to rescinded
their petition, and sign a letter of apology. The letter stated:
We the undersigned chiefs of the Cree Nation who signed the Treaty that was made
at Carlton last summer wish you to express to our Good Father, the Governor of this
Country our entire, and complete content and satisfaction with the terms and conditions
of that treaty; and to thank our good Mother the Queen in our own manners, for the
governors way in which she has fulfilled the promises they made to us ... We want also
to tell you that we are well pleased with the way in which you have dealt with us, for the
patience you have borne with our many questions and the kindness you have shown in
explaining the articles of the Treaty that we do not quite understand.11

There are two remarkable points that must be noted regarding this incident. First
the bands, when confronted by Walker, acquiesced to the demands of the departmental official and apologized for their actions. In the early years of the treaty,
chiefs were quick to rescind their earlier demands when confronted and asked for
specifics. Another point of interest is in the last sentence of the letter signed by
the chiefs. In it, the chiefs say that they were thankful for the agent’s explanation
of the treaty terms. By doing so, they not only admitted that their interpretation of
the terms was different to that of the Department of Indian Affairs, but that they
may not have fully understood the treaty terms or, at the very least, not understood
the government’s interpretation of the terms. This would not be the last reference
of this nature.
In the following year, 1878, another incident attracted the attention of the
department. Chief Pasqua, an original signatory to Treaty 4 in 1874 and a leader
in the call for Aboriginal people to make the transition to agriculture, travelled to
Winnipeg to meet with Lieutenant-Governor Cauchon. In the account drafted by
Cauchon’s interpreter, Pasqua presented a series of complaints about the inadequacies of the treaties. Seeing the lieutenant-governor as a more direct representative of the Queen than the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs, Pasqua
asked that Cauchon call upon the Queen to rectify the inadequacies of the treaties.
The report stated that the chief believed that the department was not fulfilling its
promises even though his band had cleared 30 acres of land for planting, adding
that “they were neither supplied with cattle to break and work the land; seed to sow
it; nor provisions to feed them while at work.”12 Pasqua also stated that specific
promises, made by Laird, to be supplied with rations were not being carried out
and that his people were starving and forced to eat their dogs while at work. He
closed his meeting with Cauchon by stating that he had come to Winnipeg as a
sign of his friendship with the representative of the Queen, but that the Indians
were “subject at time to an irritation of feeling against the white race who while
establishing themselves in comfort on their broad domain have directly or indirectly caused such havoc in the Northwest and that without assistance there was
nothing left for them to do but suffer and die.”13
When Cauchon’s office forwarded a report to the Department of Indian Affairs,
Laird was quick to refute Pasqua’s claims and question the value of his character.
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While sources prior to this incident cited Pasqua as an industrious and valuable
leader amongst the Cree who had already adopted farming prior to the Treaty,
Laird dismissed his complaints as baseless and stated that Pasqua “is the most
untruthful chief whom I have met in this Superintendency and though not really
so poor as many others, he is a great beggar.”14 In regard to Pasqua’s statement
that he had made promises to feed the bands during planting, Laird refuted the
claim and returned to the letter of the text of the treaty, stating that “there is
no stipulation to that effect in Treaty no. 4.”15 Because Laird refuted Pasqua’s
claims, the department saw no need to address the claims and ignored them.
Pasqua, however, was no longer considered a good chief, but rather as a troublesome one, a typical conclusion made by the department towards any chief who
dared complain.
David Laird’s dismissal of Pasqua’s complaints as frivolous and exaggerated was typical of the “outside service,” the Indian agents scattered across the
Territories, and of the department. In late 1877, the Indian Department in Ottawa
sent a circular to all agents in Manitoba and the Northwest from the superintendent general of Indian Affairs. The circular asked that reports of the status of
Indian affairs by agency be sent to Ottawa. One question in particular related
to the implementation of treaties: “Are the Indians satisfied with the manner in
which the treaty are [sic] being carried out; if not, what are the grounds of their
dissatisfaction?”16 On the whole, the agents stated that the bands in their agencies
were largely satisfied with the implementation of the treaties and that there
were but a few complaints regarding the quantity of stock animals and implements due to them.17 David Laird, as the highest ranking departmental official,
rejected any possibility of complaints: “The Indians of this superintendency [the
entire Northwest Territories] have no reason to be dissatisfied with the manner
treaty obligations are carried out.”18 He further stated that the only complaint he
received pertained to the quantity of provisions being distributed at the time of
treaty payments. As there was no provision to issue rations at the treaty payments
in the treaties, this could not be considered a complaint about the fulfilment of the
treaty terms. Laird added that the issuance of rations was “a necessity forced upon
the Government in order to enable the Indians from the Plains to subsist while
away from their hunting grounds,” and he saw such complaints as unreasonable
considering the massive government expenditure.
Without a single agent reporting any general dissatisfaction among the bands
and Laird’s categorical rejection of complaints, one must question the purpose of
the reports in light of Pasqua’s meeting and the 1877 petition of the Carlton chiefs.
As the Indian Affairs department was also using these reports as a measure of
the agents’ management of their agencies, agents themselves appear to downplay
the complaints made by bands. In several instances, the agents stated that the
bands were satisfied, but had a few minor complaints and proceeded to list several
specific complaints dealing with the fulfilment of promises for stock animals and
implements.19 Agents replied that the bands were asking more than the treaty
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entitled them to receive. Any possible complaints were explained away not as any
mismanagement on the part of the agent, but rather as excessive and unreasonable
demands by the bands.

Indian Activism and Government Refusals
The reports of departmental officials are, thankfully, not the only source of information regarding complaints of treaty non-fulfilment made by bands. Chiefs
were quick to use the available resources at their disposal to press the government to look into their complaints. The letters, petitions, and delegations were so
numerous as to lead government officials to view Aboriginal peoples as chronic
complainers. While it is impossible to review every single complaint made, two
occasions merit special review: the interview of chiefs by the governor general,
the Marquis of Lorne, in 1881, and the letter to the prime minister printed in the
Edmonton Bulletin in 1883.
As part of his general tour of Western Canada, the Marquis of Lorne travelled
throughout the Territories and large-scale meetings with chiefs were held in the
different treaty areas. For the Aboriginal population, the news of the coming of the
governor general was seen as an occasion for a grand council where their concerns
could be expressed to the direct representative of the Queen. In a society so closely
linked by family relations, the fact that the Marquis was also the Queen’s son-inlaw signified to the assembled chiefs the importance of his status and influence.
During his tour, Lorne held meetings with the chiefs at Qu’Appelle in the
Treaty 4 area and at Fort Carlton in the Treaty 6 region. Not fully understanding the somewhat symbolic role of the governor general, the chiefs of Treaties 4
and 6 believed that the Marquis of Lorne could undertake steps to address their
grievances. Over the course of the two meetings, the governor general was
addressed by numerous and influential chiefs and headmen.
At both meetings, the chiefs presented three specific arguments: the insufficiency of the treaty terms, the need to renegotiate, and the need for more assistance. At Qu’Appelle, Chief Kanasis told Lorne that they could not “make [their]
living by what was given to [them] by the Treaty.”20 This sentiment was repeated
by Yellow Quill and Louis O’Soup. The chiefs explained that their people were
without horses because they had been forced to eat them, and that they did not
know how to farm because no one had taught them how to use their tools. Yellow
Quill’s statements regarding the nature of the treaties are a good representation
of the other chiefs’ comments. He openly stated that he did “not understand the
Treaty” and that a new treaty was necessary because “we cannot live by the first
treaty: we shall die off ... They [the government] cannot hold the treaty that was
made before.”21 The chiefs called upon the governor general to reopen the treaties
and negotiate more generous terms for the Aboriginal signatories. Chiefs such
as Poundmaker, the influential Cree leader from the Battleford district, recalled
Alexander Morris’s words at the treaty negotiations in 1876 when it was stated that
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the Indian would live like the white man. Poundmaker told Lorne that the treaty
terms did not permit him to live like the white settlers and that better tools and
implements, similar to those used by the settlers, should be provided to him.22
In response to these constant calls for a new treaty and more assistance, the
Marquis de Lorne responded in a manner typical of the federal government and
white society as a whole. Lorne saw the bands as lazy and idle with no real desire
to adapt to the new reality of the Northwest (Carter 1990, 144). Lorne stressed
that the treaties had brought peace to the Territories and that it was because of
the benevolence of the Queen that such a thing was possible. He also underlined
the fact that the chiefs had already signed a treaty and that such agreements must
be respected. He reminded them that the Queen would respect her promises and
that the “red men” must do the same. He also expressed some displeasure at the
constant calls for a new treaty and said, “I hope to hear nothing more of breaking
treaty for the treaty was made for them and their children’s good. And no good
man among them need fear that he will not be as well off as the white man.”23
The chiefs came away from their council with the governor general with nothing
more than a few presents and statements that the treaties must be maintained as
they were negotiated. Their experience with the Queen’s son-in-law proved to be
similar to every other meeting with government officials.
The other incident that garnered considerable attention was a letter to the
prime minister that appeared in the Edmonton Bulletin. Signed by nine chiefs,
including all of the chiefs of the Hobbema agency south of Edmonton, the letter
is a striking complaint of their treatment since signing Treaty 6. The chiefs argued
that the treaty was only favourable for the federal government—“the white man
had it all his own way. He made the conditions both for himself and for us”—and
that the Department of Indian Affairs treated the bands like groups of children.
They stressed that, at the signing, the treaty was said to be inviolable and binding
upon both parties, but that only the Indian was required to follow the treaty while
the federal government did what it wished and ignored its promises and obligations. As did the chiefs who met with the governor general, the letter referred
to the promises made by the Treaty commissioners that the treaties would help
the Indians survive and prosper. Since the treaty, the bands had become povertystricken and starving, and the chiefs feared that their people would eventually
disappear from the Plains. They closed by warning that their complaints should be
addressed or they “shall conclude that the treaty made with us six years ago was
meaningless matter of form and that the white man had indirectly doomed us to
annihilation, little by little.”24
Despite the chiefs’ warnings, the department paid little heed to the letters’
complaints and accusations. Rather, Lawrence Vankoughnet, the deputy superintendent general, and Edgar Dewdney, the Indian commissioner, spent the next
several months trying to find whom had written the letter for the chiefs. When
Father C. Scollen, a Catholic missionary in the Edmonton district and a man
highly critical of the Indian department, was finally identified, they accused him
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of acting in a treasonous manner and of causing great harm to the bands by raising
their expectations and spreading lies.25 The archival files of the Department of
Indian Affairs contain a copy of the original letter printed in the Bulletin, and
some 20 pages worth of correspondence relating to the department’s efforts at
identifying Scollen, but not a single document disputes or even addresses the
complaints presented in the letter.
As letters, petitions, and delegations proved to be largely ineffectual, other
chiefs chose different routes in attempts to enforce the fulfilment of treaty terms.
Poundmaker, Piapot, and Big Bear, all very influential and powerful chiefs in
their own right, each chose a different tactic: Poundmaker refused to work; Piapot
refused to take a reserve; and Big Bear refused to take treaty. Each had his own
reasons for discontent. During the Fort Carlton negotiations, Poundmaker, at the
time a headman and not a chief, openly opposed the treaty and demanded that the
chiefs wait for better terms. In the years after the treaty, he routinely challenged
the authority of Indian agents and demanded more implements and more sophisticated machinery, all the while demanding rations for his band (Department
of Indian Affairs, 1882, 195). Piapot, while not present at the 1874 signing of
Treaty 4, was one of the leading chiefs who demanded that the treaty be modified
during the 1875 treaty payment at Qu’Appelle. As with many chiefs in the
Treaty 4 area, Piapot wanted his reserve to be in the Cypress Hills, a location
rejected by the department (Morin 2003). Told to take a reserve near Indian Head,
Piapot refused to select a specific site until 1882, when the department agreed to
his selection and provided rations and transportation to the reserve.26 As for Big
Bear, his band’s hunting expedition cost him the chance to speak at the Fort Pitt
negotiations for Treaty 6, and he staunchly believed the treaty terms to be meagre
and insufficient to meet the needs of the Plains people. Big Bear continually
refused to sign the treaty and travelled across the Prairie in search of buffalo, often
crossing into Montana. He met with various chiefs and Aboriginal leaders trying
to garner support for a renegotiation of the treaties (Dempsey 1984, 122). Only
after starvation and desertions to other bands had severely reduced the number of
his followers did Big Bear take treaty at Fort Walsh in 1882.
Of the three chiefs, Big Bear was considered by far the most influential and
potentially dangerous leader on the Prairie. As has already been stated, Big Bear
had one of the largest followings among the Plains Cree in the Treaty 6 area,
and was well respected as a wise man not only for his council but also for his
medicine. While starvation forced him to adhere to the treaty, Big Bear was
still determined to continue to press the Department of Indian Affairs for better
treaty terms. Refusing to take a reserve, or by asking for land that he knew would
be rejected by officials, he travelled across the region, calling upon the other
chiefs to stand united with him against the federal government. By 1884, Big
Bear had considerable support from among the different bands. In his report to
Edgar Dewdney about Big Bear calling upon the department to fulfil the treaties,
Agent J.A. McRae stated that “a year ago, [Big Bear] stood alone, in making
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these demands; now, the whole of the Indians are with him.”27 Big Bear encouraged other chiefs to stand together when confronting agents and other government officials, a tactic adopted by Louis O’Soup in the Treaty 4 area.28 For his
refusal to take treaty and a reserve, as well as his constant meetings with chiefs,
the higher-ranking officers of the department viewed Big Bear with considerable
suspicion. Hayter Reed, one-time Indian agent and assistant Indian commissioner
for the Northwest, described Big Bear as “an agitator and always has been and
having received the moral support of the half-breed community he is only too
glad to have the opportunity of inciting the Indians to make fresh and exorbitant
demands.”29 Every statement and meeting Big Bear made was closely monitored
by the department. While Big Bear was getting the attention that he wanted, it
was for the entirely wrong reasons. The Department of Indian Affairs continued
to dismiss his claims as gross exaggerations of the treaty terms and his actions
as nothing more than troublesome behaviour. The officials of the Department of
Indian Affairs continued to be blind to any link between the claims and complaints
being made and their own implementation of the treaties.
The general feeling of dissatisfaction with the department’s policies and
practices, and Big Bear’s efforts to unite the bands across the Northwest,
coalesced in 1883 and 1884 in a series of councils. Sponsored by some of the
chiefs considered by Dewdney and Reed to be the most troublesome, the department looked upon these gatherings with suspicion. The focus of these councils,
which also included the traditional thirst or sun dance, was to decide how best to
deal with the federal government’s non-fulfilment of the treaties and what tactic
should be employed to negotiate new agreements with the Crown. Piapot and Big
Bear were, again, central figures in this latest attempt to organize the bands. As
both chiefs were of the same mind regarding the need to stand united against the
federal government, Piapot and Big Bear wanted the councils to give them the
authority to represent the other chiefs and present their grievances and complaints
to Dewdney and Macdonald. In Piapot’s case, a council and dance was held on
his reserve in the fall of 1883 with attendance by most of the Treaty 4 chiefs.
During the meetings, Piapot had little difficulty convincing the others to change
their stance towards the government officials. Recognizing the need for wider
representation, the council concluded with a call to hold a grand council of the
Northwest where representatives from the Cree, Assiniboine, and Blackfoot bands
would attend to plan an appropriate strategy to deal with the federal government
in a united manner (Dempsey 1984, 123).
As messengers travelled between reserves calling the bands together, the
Department of Indian Affairs, thinking that these councils were the prelude to a
violent uprising, began to flex its muscles in response. Senior officials were also
very much aware of the purpose of the councils. In March 1884, J.M. Rae, Indian
agent for the Carlton district, stated in a letter to Edgar Dewdney that “messengers are being sent all over the Country and that the chiefs all over the Country
are to join those B/ford rascals next summer in asking for better terms.”30 As Rae
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notes, the chiefs’ dissatisfaction with the treaty terms was well known. Because
the department saw the terms of the treaties as fixed and non-negotiable, officials
perceived these councils as fomenting dissent and, therefore, to be prevented. Rae
gave a clear representation of the Crown’s position in his same letter to the Indian
commissioner:
A firm stand must be taken and the answer no given to all their demands, for if they
succeed this time, years will not undo the work of one day. At the present they think
they can do anything they like—and they must be disabused of this idea even by force if
necessary—the Chiefs from below here will take and active part in the matter unless they
see what a grave turn affairs are taking here. [emphasis in original]31

As there were a relatively small number of North West Mounted Police in the
Territories, agents had few coercive powers. The only true method of influence at
Indian agents’ disposal was the refusal of rations. When a chief came to ask for
rations for the trip to a council in 1884, Indian Agent Rae was quick to refuse the
request, stating that the federal government disapproved of the council meeting,
while trying to dissuade the chief from attending.32
The councils were, on the whole, very well attended. The biggest council
of 1884 was hosted by Big Bear and Poundmaker, on Poundmaker’s reserve near
Battleford. These meetings of the chiefs proved to be constructive and accomplished Big Bear’s goal of unifying the bands. The final outcome of the council
was instruction for a delegation led by Big Bear to travel first to see Piapot in
Treaty 4, then to Dewdney in Regina, and finally onward to Ottawa to meet with
Vankoughnet. Their goal was to express the concerns and desires of the chiefs to
the highest possible officials; specifically, to the superintendent general of Indian
Affairs, Sir John A. Macdonald (Dempsey 1984, 123). Any possible success the
proposed delegation might have had, however, was ruined before the council was
concluded. During the council, a farm instructor named Craig was assaulted by
a small group from the Yellow Quill band, who stopped by his house asking for
provisions. When Craig refused, he was struck by one of the men and subsequently lodged a complaint with the nearby North West Mounted Police post.
When the constables arrived at the council to arrest the man in question, a large
confrontation occurred and violence was only averted by the intervention of Big
Bear and Poundmaker and the voluntary surrender of the suspect by the council to
the NWMP a few days later.33 This incident completely overshadowed the rest of
the council and dance. The near outbreak of violence put the Department of Indian
Affairs and the NWMP on the defensive. Dewdney was no longer willing to meet
with any delegations, and all the blame for the incident was placed on Big Bear
and Poundmaker for having organized the council in the first place. The incident,
however, led to a review of the department’s policy regarding rations and the
discretionary powers of agents.
With a growing number of incidents between departmental officials and Indians
occurring across the Northwest, Dewdney, Hayter Reed, and Deputy Superintendent General Lawrence Vankoughnet began to focus their attention on the
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influence of specific chiefs as being at the root of the problems. Reed, the assistant
Indian commissioner, was an ever-increasing presence in Indian Affairs. After
Dewdney’s assumption of the role of lieutenant governor of the Northwest Territories, Reed took on an ever-growing amount of responsibility. As he personally
investigated incidents between officials and bands, his views and perspective of
Indian-government relations became more and more important. Reed maintained
the view that the bands were generally content with their treatment by the department, and that certain chiefs, namely Big Bear and Poundmaker, were stirring up
dissent. He investigated a petition presented to Agent Macrae in the fall of 1884,
which listed 18 items of complaint about the implementation of the treaties. Reed’s
report dismissed all the complaints.34 He had in the past responded to complaints
by saying that they were based on “false statements being made by them [the
chiefs] and constantly repeated until they become a matter of belief as no one
was ever present capable of giving them a denial.”35 Reed based his opinion on
his direct experiences with individual chiefs. During those meetings, he pressed
chiefs to show how the treaties had not been fulfilled and explained away the basis
of every complaint with examples of the Crown’s fulfilment of its obligations.
Reed reported that Big Bear’s involvement in the petition was further proof of his
role as a “troublemaker” in the district.36 As a sign of Reed’s growing influence on
Indian policy, in a reply to Reed’s report from the Department of Indian Affairs,
likely from Vankoughnet, the department stated that “it would appear from Mr.
Reed’s report that the Indians have no good grounds for serious complaint in any
respect.”37 The memorandum goes on to instruct all Indian agents to explain to the
bands that the treaties were being fulfilled and that the federal government was
giving them far more than what was stated in the treaties.
As they were seen as the most disruptive influences to the proper administration
of Indian affairs in the Northwest, senior departmental officials wanted to remove
these “troublesome” chiefs from their positions. Vankoughnet, in a February 1885
letter, asked Dewdney for his opinion on how best to deal with Big Bear, Little
Pine, and Poundmaker, calling them “Indians [who] incite or stir up other Indians
... to act in a riotous, disorderly or threatening manner.”38 Vankoughnet suggested
that such people should be used as examples to the general Aboriginal population
through their arrest and imprisonment. Dewdney agreed whole-heartedly with his
superior’s plan but noted that the territorial judicial system did not view the matter
in the same way. Where the Department of Indian Affairs wanted convictions and
imprisonment of chiefs for “disloyalty” and stirring up discontent, the magistrates and the North West Mounted Police only arrested and convicted people
for specific crimes as listed in the Criminal Code.39 Dewdney went so far as to
suggest the code itself be amended to make the prosecution of chiefs easier. No
modification to the Criminal Code was ever made in this regard.
As Dewdney and Vankoughnet debated how to rid themselves of the chiefs,
the North West Mounted Police was growing increasingly concerned with the
policies of the Department of Indian Affairs. Throughout 1884, police inspectors
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and constables were reporting on the state of Indian affairs from a police perspective. In his report of the 1884 incident during Big Bear and Poundmaker’s council,
Inspector W.W. Crozier of the Battleford detachment placed the blame for the
incident not on the chiefs, but rather on the department’s policies. He stated, “if the
government wish to conduct Indian affairs peacefully, their policy should be, as
it has been in the past, one of conciliation.” He roundly condemned Indian policy
by questioning the very nature of the civilization program: “It does not seem to
me reasonable to expect a lot of pure savages to settle down and become steady
farmers all at once—or even within a few years—and even if they do not do much
work for some time, it should not be considered extraordinary.”40 He continued by
suggested that the refusal of the bands’ demands would lead to further confrontation. He also warned that the bands were prepared to resist any attempts interfere
with them, and that further confrontation would adversely affect the whole of the
Territories. The inspector’s words had little impact upon the administration in the
Northwest. Agents did not receive more discretionary powers to issue rations, the
work for food policy was continued, and discontent among the bands continued
to increase. Crozier’s warnings of possible future violence became reality in the
spring of 1885.

Rebellion and the End of the Treaty Movement
On April 2, 1885, Big Bear’s attempts at negotiating new treaties with the federal
government came to a quick and violent end. Shortly after the Métis victory at
Duck Lake, and while Big Bear was absence from his camp, several warriors
from his band and the neighbouring Wood Cree band attacked the settlement of
Frog Lake, looting the Hudson’s Bay Company store and killing nine people,
including the Indian agent, Thomas Quinn; the farm instructor, John Delaney;
and two Catholic priests (Morton 1979, 77). Bolstered by additional warriors
from Bobtail’s Reserve and the Cold Lake Chipewyans, the bands moved down
the Saskatchewan River towards Fort Pitt, where they met Little Poplar and
his followers from Battleford, who had been waiting before the fort (Dempsey 1984, 168). On April 14, 1885, Fort Pitt surrendered and then was pillaged by
the Cree for war plunder. After receiving news that Poundmaker was under attack
by soldiers and police, the camp was moved to Frenchman’s Butte. On May 28,
1885, the Cree warriors ambushed the militia forces of General Strange, who was
tracking the Cree from Fort Pitt (Beal and Macleod 1984, 284). During the battle,
the Chipewyans deserted, prisoners escaped, and the Cree warriors began to fall
back. Fleeing towards Loon Lake, the Cree were again attacked by the militia
on June 3, 1885. The Wood Cree left the group to take refuge in the forests and
others headed towards Batoche, while a number of warriors held out until the end
of June. Big Bear’s son, Imasees, avoiding patrols and the militia, led more than
a hundred Cree south across the border to take refuge in the United States. On
July 4, 1885, Big Bear, alone, abandoned by his band, surrendered to the militia
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at Fort Carlton (Dempsey 1984, 180). Big Bear, Poundmaker, and nearly 45 other
“rebel Indians” were put on trial, along with Louis Riel and other Métis arrested
after the battle of Batoche (Dickason 2002, 311). Big Bear was sentenced to three
years imprisonment, as was Poundmaker, although their sentences were reduced
to 18 months after both developed serious illnesses. Big Bear was released in
early 1887, and, having never taken a reserve, joined his daughter on Poundmaker’s reserve.
As the events on the North Saskatchewan unfolded, numerous chiefs across
the region refused to participate in the uprising. The concerns of the North West
Mounted Police and government officials, such as Reed and Dewdney, that the
uprising would spread to all the bands in the Territories, proved to be unfounded.
From the first instances of violence, several chiefs attempted to distance themselves from the bands in revolt and made overtures of peace to the Crown. Chiefs
such as George Bear, Pasqua, and Piapot, all sent letters and telegrams to Ottawa
stating their loyalty to the Crown. They all referred to the treaties as the source
of their loyalty, as did a group of chiefs from the Wolf Creek region of Alberta:
“At the Treaty, we were promised peace, not war, and we wish to remain loyal
till death.”41 Piapot, once considered one of the more “troublesome” chiefs in
Treaty 4, also referred to his promise of loyalty by stating, “It is eleven years
since I gave up fighting. When I took the Government Treaty, I touched the pen
not to interfere with the white man and the white man not to interfere with me ... I
promise you [Macdonald] as I have promised our Governor that I will never fight
against the white man.”42 All the while promising their loyalty, the chiefs used the
occasion of their communication to stress again for the fulfilment of the treaty
promises. Chiefs Ochapascoopeeasis and Rock Chief both reminded the federal
government that they remained loyal, even though all the treaty provisions had
not been fulfilled.43 In his letter, Pasqua comments on the poor state of his band
by saying, “We depend on promises by Governor Morris to us because of our
keeping faith, and hope when trouble is ended that she [the Queen] will extend
some help to us on our reserves to make a better living than before.”44 Interestingly, Prime Minister Macdonald responded directly to the telegrams and letters,
stating that “the Government will do everything that they properly can to forward
the interests and improve the conditions of the red man. All treaty promises will
be faithfully carried out and loyalty of these chiefs is fully appreciated.”45 As it
had been prior to the uprising, however, the treaty promises were “carried out”
according to the federal government’s understanding of its obligations.
In the aftermath of the defeat of Riel and the Métis at the battle of Batoche, the
Department of Indian Affairs attempted to ascertain why part of the Aboriginal
population had rebelled. Again relying on reports by Hayter Reed, Lawrence Vankoughnet placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of Riel, Poundmaker, and Big
Bear, describing them as disloyal troublemakers who had always been opposed to
Canada’s administration of the Northwest. Following the line of argument that had
been presented prior to the events of the spring of 1885, Reed and Vankoughnet
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saw Big Bear and Poundmaker as the leaders of the Indian rebellion, disregarding
several eyewitness accounts to the contrary. As leaders of disloyal bands, they
were to bear the brunt of the blame.46 As a result of their involvement, the rebellious bands were considered to have violated the treaties they had signed, and
their treaty rights were to be suspended until such time as the department saw fit
to restore them. On Reed’s recommendation, the department instituted a series of
punitive measures against any rebellious Indians, such as withholding annuities, a
pass system, and breaking up bands.47 While Vankoughnet’s memorandum stated
that loyal bands would not face any such restrictions, certain measures, especially
the pass system, were applied to all bands in the Northwest.
One of the major consequences of the rebellion was a hardening of the Department of Indian Affairs’s position towards complaints. In the first years after the
uprising, any chief that dared complain about missing treaty cattle or not having
received his full complement of implements was accused of disloyalty. The
department continued to keep a close watch on bands, and appointed regional
officials to tour reserves and report on the level of discontentment among the
bands. An example of one such tour was the one made by the Anglican bishop of
the Northwest Territories, J.A. MacKay, to the Battleford bands. While he found
most of the bands fairly complacent, the bishop noted that some bands were
disgruntled and that only the constant presence of troops in the area was preventing a repetition of the events of the previous year.48
As the Department of Indian Affairs began to enforce its new restrictive policies,
its general handling of the Aboriginal population in the Northwest and, specifically, its respect of the treaties, was being questioned in Ottawa. The member
of Parliament for Huron-West, Malcolm Cameron, presented a strong criticism
of the department’s handling of the treaties and the rebellion. Using first-hand
accounts from prominent figures in the Northwest Territories, such as Father
Scollen, and the reports of the department itself, Cameron presented the case that
the root causes of the rebellion were the non-fulfilment of the terms of the treaties
and the refusal of the Department of Indian Affairs to acknowledge its mistakes.
He went on to criticize every aspect of Indian administration, from the quality of
the implements and cattle to the morality and character of Indian agents and the
Indian commissioner. Cameron was adamant that the blame of the uprising had to
rest with the department’s officials.
The conduct of the officials of the North-West Territories, more than any thing else,
created dissatisfaction and discontent among the Indians; I say that the misconduct and
the mismanagement of the Administration in connection with the Indian Affairs in the
North-West Territories, as much as anything else produced uneasiness, dissatisfaction
and discontent among the Indians, which ultimately broke out into open rebellion.49

Cameron also accused the federal government of breaking the promises made in
the treaties, what he called “solemn covenants entered into with the Indians ...
shamefully, openly, persistently and systematically broken by this Government.”50
He concluded that “instead of dealing fairly and honestly by the Indian, as we
This is an excerpt from "Volume 4: Moving Forward, Making a Difference," in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.

142  /  Part Two: Governance

ought to have done, instead of maintaining unbroken our treaty obligations with
the Indian, we pursued, and we still pursue that mad and reckless and inhuman
policy of submission by starvation.”
The MP’s remarks in the House of Commons were a surprisingly accurate
representation of the arguments being made by Treaty chiefs in the 10 years
following the signing of the treaties. As usual, the Department of Indian Affairs
responded to Cameron by outlining how the government had endeavoured to fulfil
the treaties. In a 60-page document, the officials of the department, specifically
Lawrence Vankoughnet, refuted every single claim made in Cameron’s speech
to the House of Commons. The departmental report refuted Cameron’s claims
on two fronts: first, by showing that it had implemented the treaties according to
the letter of the text and more so; and second, that Treaty bands had not properly
understood the nature of the federal government’s obligations under the treaties.
In response to the claims that the bands had not receive all the implements and
cattle they asked for, the report states that all that was entitled to by the treaties
had been issued to the bands. The department added that the issue at hand was
not what was promised in the treaty but, rather, what the chiefs demanded beyond
the terms of the treaty (Department of Indian Affairs 1886, 37). The department
stated that while it could have limited itself to the terms of the treaty, it had been in
fact far more generous, reporting that the bands “certainly have received far more
than they were entitled to under their treaties. Let it not be forgotten that with a
single exception [Treaty 6] not one of the treaties stipulates that the Government
shall supply the Indians with food” (5). The rationing of Aboriginal people was
done “as a measure of humanity” and that food was issued so as to encourage the
bands to become self-sustaining. The overarching policy goal of civilization was
reinforced again, while refuting the claims of a starvation policy: “The provisions
supplied them are so distributed as to encourage industry. Men who absolutely
refuse to work are certainly not encouraged in their idleness.”
The departmental report attributed the Treaty bands’ incomprehension of the
federal government’s treaty obligations largely to their “primitive condition” and
childish manner. The report stated that the Treaty bands “have very imperfect
notions of the duties of the Government towards them, and of their claims upon
the Government. They desire to get all they can; and they are deeply incensed
when they think they have been wronged” (Department of Indian Affairs 1886,
3). Moreover, the report accuses of Cameron of spreading the same “exaggerated
notions of their rights” as had been claimed by leaders such as Big Bear, Piapot,
and Poundmaker. The department stated that it was its responsibility to care for
the bands while they were in a state of “simplicity” and “ignorance.” Furthermore, it saw itself as the ultimate arbiter of what was required for their advancement and what was beyond their capabilities (5). The department’s rebuttal of
Cameron’s allegations brought the matter to a close. While there was a short
debate in the Senate regarding Cameron’s presentation later that year, the issue of
treaties and the fulfilment of treaty obligations never returned to the floor of the
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House of Commons. The unmediated implementation of the Department of Indian
Affairs’ policies and their effect on the lives of Aboriginal people in the Northwest
remained largely unchallenged for the next 70 years. Over the course of that time,
successive amendments to the Indian Act brought ever-tighter controls over the
daily lives of Treaty bands.
In the past 130 years, the confrontational positions of Treaty First Nations
and the federal government have remained largely unchanged, although the
conflict was suppressed. First Nations still claim that the treaties have remained
largely unfulfilled while the Crown’s position is that treaty obligations have been
respected in accordance to the letter of the text. While Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada maintains a largely similar position to the one it held back in the late nineteenth century, the Treaty First Nations have modified their position. In the 1870s
and 1880s, treaty leaders continuously remarked that the treaties they had signed
were not sufficient to allow them to either continue their traditional way of life or
to adapt to the new agricultural lifestyle being advocated by the department. This
perception of the insufficiencies of the existing treaties led to a series of calls for
a renegotiation of the treaties, and attempts to get better terms.
Today, Treaty First Nations are looking for new agreements that would build
upon their existing treaties. While the replacement of the treaty was an aspect
of the earlier Yukon Umbrella Agreement and some comprehensive land claim
agreements in the Northwest Territories, more recent negotiations have stalled or
broken off, such as the Akaitcho negotiations, because the agreements on the table
did not reflect the earlier treaty. The same has happened in Saskatchewan with the
long-standing self-government negotiations between Canada and the Federation
of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. In this case, Grand Chief Alphonse Bird linked
the rejection of the final agreement at the referendum level to the failure to see
any clear references to the Numbered Treaties. As self-government and comprehensive land claim negotiations continue, the respect accorded to the Numbered
Treaties and the need to reflect them in modern agreements are becoming central
issues, aggravated by the continuing gap that exists between Crown and Treaty
First Nations’ perceptions of the implementation of the treaties themselves.
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